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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Actions of National Labor Relations Board'
Immune to Injunctive Interference by Federal Courts-The National
Labor Relations Board, pursuant to its authority under the controlling act," noti-
fied plaintiff corporation of a proposed hearing of a complaint which averred that
the plaintiff engaged in unfair labor practices. Thereupon, the plaintiff, denying
that the Board had jurisdiction, and alleging irreparable injury if the proceedings
were allowed, obtained an injunction against the Board.2 The circuit court of
appeals having affirmed the decree," and denied a rehearing 4 after the act was
declared constitutional by the Supreme Court, 5 certiorari was granted. Held, that
the district court should have refused the injunction since Congress had given
exclusive jurisdiction over labor matters to the Board, and the act provided
for an adequate remedy by appeal from the Board's decisions. Myers v. Bethle-
hem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1938) 5 U. S. L. W.EK 6o3.
Under similar facts, plaintiff, a Virginia corporation, was denied an injunc-
tion on the ground that the act provided adequate relief. This was affirmed by
the circuit court,8 and certiorari was granted because of conflict with the above
case. Held, that the injunction was properly refused. Newport News Shipbuild.
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, U. S.'Sup. Ct., (938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 605.
Although the instant cases are the first in which the Supreme Court has ruled
that a district court cannot enjoin the proceedings of the National Labor Relations
Board, all but one of the circuit court decisions have so held.7 The constitution-
ality of the Board's jurisdiction over labor matters affecting interstate commerce
having been upheld in the Jones & Laughlin case," the fundamental contention of
the petitioners was that they engaged in intrastate transactions alone. They
claimed, therefore, that the Board had no jurisdiction over them, and that the
proposed hearings would cause irreparable injury. However, the mere fact that
an administrative remedy may be costly is insufficient to warrant judicial inter-
ference.9 Furthermore, since the act provides expressly that the Board shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all complaints, 0 and that its findings are subject to
judicial review,1 ' there is no ground for injunctive interference from the courts.
It is well settled that judicial relief cannot be sought until the administrative
remedies prescribed have been exhausted.' 2 Thus, the courts have refused to
z. TE NATiONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ S1-
166 (Supp. 1937).
2. 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1936), 25 GEo. L. J. 470 (1937).
3. 88 F. (2d) I54 (C. C. A. ist, 1937).
4. 89 F. (2d) IOOO (C. C. A. Ist, 1937).
S. National Labor Relations Bd v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937),
85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 733.
6. 91 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
7. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 84 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. sth,
1936) ; E. L Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Boland, 85 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Heller
Bros. Co. v. Lind, 86 F. (2d) 862 (App. D. C. 1936) ; Clark v. Lindemann & Hoverson Co.,
88 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Pratt v. Oberman & Co., 89 F. (ad) 786 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937). Contra: Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 88 F. (2d) 154 (C. C. A. Ist,
1937) (first of instant cases, lower ct.).
8. See mipra note 5.
9. See Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 84 F. (2d) 97, 10 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1936).
10. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (Supp. 1937).
IM. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (f) (Supp. i937).
12. Where no further remedy remains, an injunction will be granted. See, for example,
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) (no means of appeal
from rates set by Public Service Commission).
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restrain proceedings of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 3 the Federal
Trade Commission,14 and other federal 15 and state "I administrative bodies where
the administrative remedy remained. As stated by the court in the first of the
two instant cases, to hold otherwise would be to deprive the Board of the powers
which Congress intended that it should have.
Conflict of Laws-Effect of Stipulation that Fraternal Beneficiary
Society Shall be Defined by Law of Member's State-Defendant fraternal
beneficiary society incorporated in Illinois issued a life insurance policy to plain-
tiff's wife in Kansas. The insured had been missing and unheard-of for over
seven years before plaintiff brought this action, relying on the common law pre-
sumption of death.' By a section of the Society's by-laws, members waived the
right to rely on presumptions of this nature. In Kansas such waiver clauses are
regarded as against public policy and void.2 In Illinois this identical clause had
been held valid and enforceable.3 Held, that because of a provision in the policy
stating that the defendant was a fraternal beneficiary society as defined by the
statutes of the member's state, the law of Kansas should govern, the waiver clause
disregarded, and the common law presumption of death allowed. Green v. Royal
Neighbors of America, 73 P. (2d) I (Kan. i937).
Ordinarily a contract made in Kansas would be governed by Kansas law.4
However, the Supreme Court in the case of Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum
v. Green 5 held in effect 1 that the rights of members of a fraternal beneficiary
society are governed by its articles and by-laws as interpreted by the jurisdiction
in which the society is incorporated, and that foreign states are bound by the
Constitution' to give full faith and credit to the decisions of the corporation's
domicil. This case was followed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision
of Modern Woodman v. Mixer,8 which held the principle applicable in determin-
ing the validity of a waiver of the common law presumption of death. The court
in the instant case recognized the authority of these decisions but held they did
not govern the disputed policy which provided that the defendant was "a fraternal
beneficiary society . . . as defined by the statutes of the state where the member
resides". Aside from the doubtful interpretation given this latter provision by the
13. United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 29I U. S. 457 (1934).
14. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U. S. I6o (1927).
I5. Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F. (2d) 8o2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (Customs Board).
I6. Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 163 (1934) (New York Milk Control
Board) ; Lazarevich v. Stoeckel, 117 Conn. 260, 167 At. 823 (1933) (Commissioner of Mo-
tor Vehicles) ; Horton v. Clark, 316 Mo. 770, 293 S. W. 362 (1927) (State Bbard of Health).
I. McKay v. Kansas Soldiers' Compensation Bd., 126 Kan. 120, 266 Pac. 935 (1928);
cases cited instant case at 5.
2. Fernandez v. Sovereign Camp, 142 Kan. 75, 46 P. (2d) 10 (I935).
3. Steen v. Modem Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 104, 129 N. E. 546 (920), 17 A. L.
R. 406 (1922).
4. Instant case at 3. This seems to be the present law in Kansas, although the earlier
cases were in confusion. See 2 BEALE CONFLICT OF LAws (935) § 332.24. For discussion
of this and opposing theories in the choice-of-law problem, see id. at §§ 332.1-332.4; Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 173.
5. 237 U. S. 531 (1915), L. R. A. 1916A 771, Note (1916) 25 YALE L. 3. 324.
6. In detail, the holding was that in determining whether an increase in the assessment
rate was binding on the member, the New York court must give full faith and credit to the
Massachusetts decisions concerning the society's constitution and by-laws.
7. ART. IV, § I; see Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 371.
8. 267 U. S. 544 (925), 41 A. L. R. 1384 (1926), 24 MICH. L. REv. 65.
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instant court,9 it is questionable whether the rule of the Green case should be made
subject to the intent of the parties. In cases where the issue is merely the choice
of law to govern the interpretation of the wording of the contract, the express
intent of the parties should be given full effect.10 But where the validity of the
contract is in question, the intent of the parties becomes secondary to more objec-
tive considerations." The issue of the instant case seems dearly of this latter
type. The rule of the Green and Mixer cases finds its justification not in any
presumed intent of the contracting parties, but in the necessity of maintaining the
integrity of the corporate structure and protecting the interests of other members
by preserving a uniform definition of membership rights within a given society.
1 2
This purpose of the rule should not be defeated by allowing an Illinois society to
become a Kansas society merely by describing itself as such in its certificate.
Constitutional Law-Corporations as "Persons" within the Meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment-California sought to tax plaintiff corporation,
licensed to do business in California, on premiums received in Connecticut on
Connecticut reinsurance contracts covering reinsuree's California policies. Held,
that the tax violated plaintiff's rights under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment;' justice Black dissented on the ground that the word
"person" in the Amendment does not include corporations. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 61o.
The dissent of Justice Black marks the first time in many years that a
Supreme Court Justice has contended that the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not extend to corporations. This dissent is based upon the
concept that the corporation is a creature of the state, the latter having the abso-
lute power of granting or refusing existence to it, and as such should be subject
to any regulations or restrictions which the state sees fit to establish. After an
elaborate inquiry into the history and language of the Amendment, Justice Black
reached the conclusion that it was intended to include only natural persons,2 and
that therefore the'right of the state to regulate corporations is not limited in any
way thereby. 3 Others have reached similar conclusions in regard to the pur-
9. According to counsel for the appellant, this provision was designed to assure the mem-
ber that he belonged to a society which was operating under the statute laws of his state
pertaining to foreign sister state fraternal societies. See Appellant's Motion for Rehearing
(Kan. Sup. Ct. No. 33394) p. 6 et seq.
1o. Canton Ins. Office v. Woodside, 90 Fed. 301 (1898) ; GooDiuCH, CoNmier OF LAWS
(,927) § iog. But cf. Owen v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 192 Atl. 158 (R. I. 1937),
86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98.
xi. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389 (1899) ; E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard
S. S. Co., 48 F. (2d) 115; BEALE, CoNFLIcT OF LAWs (1935) § 332.2; GoomilcH, CoNFLmcr
OF LAws (1927) 232. But some courts have allowed the parties to choose their jurisdiction
to a limited extent even under these circumstances. See BEALE, loc. cit. s zpra.
12. See Royal Arcanum v. Brashears, 89 Md. 624, 630, 43 Atl. 866, 867 (i899) ; Royal
Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 542 (1915) ; Note (1926) 41 A. L. R. 1384, 1393.
i. For a discussion of the taxation question involved, see case note in this issue of the
RmIw at 554.
2. Immediately after the passage of the Amendment, the courts felt that the purpose was
solely to protect the negroes. See Slaughter House Cases, x6 Wall. 36, 81 (U. S. 1872).
Cf. Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (U. S. 1872) (state law which forbade women from prac-
tising law held not within protection of I4th Amendment) ; Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129
(U. S. 1873) (state legislation as to sale of liquors not under its protection) ; Minor v. Hap-
persett, 21 Wall. 162 (U. S. 1874) (right of suffrage not under privilege and immunities
clause) ; Walker v. Sauvinett, 92 U. S. 90 (1875) (nor is right to trial by jury).
3. Instant case at 613.
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pose of the Amendment. 4  On the other hand, since 1886,5 the courts have
extended the protection of due process to corporations, feeling that they are as
much in need of protection against arbitrary and discriminatory legislation by the
states as natural persons are.6 The legal theory employed was one which existed
even before the Fourteenth Amendment was passed.7  Wherever a provision is
made for the protection of contract or property rights of persons, the provision
includes corporations, since the latter is made up of individuals or "persons" who
are protected thereunder. "It would be a most singular result if the constitu-
tional provision . . . should cease to exert such protection the moment a person
becomes a member of a corporation." 8 In looking beyond the name of the arti-
ficial being to the individuals whom it represents, the courts find that the property
of the corporation is the property of the shareholders, and that therefore the state
cannot act without restriction merely because of the corporate fiction. While
there is much to be said for Justice Black's position as well as the one taken by
the courts, to adopt the view that corporations are not entitled to due process of
law would be to upset an enormous body of decisions10 and might have serious
effects on our economic system.' 1
Criminal Law-Electricity as the Subject of Larceny-Defendant,
indicted for larceny for diverting electricity around a meter so as to prevent regis-
tration of the total amount used, moved to quash the indictment on the grounds
that electricity was not the subject of larceny, and that a statute punishing the
4. See Dobyns, Justice Holnes and the Fourteenth Amendment (igi) 13 IL.T L. REv.
7,; Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 47 YALE L. 3.
371; Hough, Due Process of Law Today (1919) 32 HAgv. L. REv. 218. See also Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (I91) 24 HAgv. L. REv. 366;
Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment (193o) I8 CALIF. L. Ray. 583.
5. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R., 118 U. S. 394 (i886), the Court re-
fused to hear argument on whether the i4th Amendment applies to corporations. Said the
Court, "We are all of the opinion that it does." Id. at 396.
6. Provident Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 103 (1915) ; Hartford Acc. & Ind.
Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934), 34 COL. L. Ray. 951, 82 U. OF PA. L.
Rxv. 863. Cf. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 26o U. S. 346 (1922). See Mc-
GEHFE, DuE PRocEss OF LAW (i9o6) c. 5; Willis, Due Process of Law under United States
Constitution (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 331.
7. In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 8
Wheat. 464 (U. S. 1823), it was held that corporations were "persons" within the meaning
of a treaty providing that no person shall suffer future loss in his person, liberty, or property
because of a part taken in a certain war.
8. Justice Field in The Railroad Cases, 13 Fed. 722, 744 (C. C. D. Cal. 1882), aff'd, 116
U. S. 138 (1882).
9. Under the same theory, prohibitions against the deprivation of life and liberty do not
apply to corporations, because the lives and liberties of the shareholders are not the life and
liberty of the corporation. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenburg, 204 U. S. 359 (907). Many
cases, following the theory of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. I868), have also held that
a corporation is not a person within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of
the I4th Amendment since the citizenship of the incorporators is not the same as that of the
corporation. See The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722, 747 (C. C. D. Cal. 1882).
io. But as pointed out in the dissent, at 612, the doctrine of stare decisis has a limited
application in constitutional law. See Lipoff v. United Food Workers, Phila. Legal Intelli-
gencer, Feb. IO, 1938, at p. 6, col. 4, noted in this issue of the RvIxW at 546.
ii. For a criticism of Justice Black's dissent, see N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1938, p. 18, col. 2.
This criticism is, however, unjust. It misinterprets Justice Black's position in that it im-
plies that he is in favor of discarding the corporate entity theory, and would rather treat a
corporation as a group of individuals. In fairness to Justice Black, his position should be
stated to be merely that corporations are not "persons" within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment, not that he thinks corporations are not "persons".
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crime charged as a misdemeanor' prevented operation of the larceny statute.2
The motion was granted. On appeal by the state, held, that the motion should
have been denied because under the statute 3 electricity was the subject of larceny,
and the fact that defendant's offense was also a misdemeanor did not prevent
indictment for larceny.4 People v. Menagas, ii N. E. (2d) 403 (IUI. 1937).
Whether electricity can be the subject of larceny in the absence of a statutory
declaration to that effect has never been directly decided by the courts of this
country. The scarcity of decisions on this point is accounted for by the fact that
practically all the states have statutes making offenses similar to that in the
instant case misdemeanors.5 Statements to the effect that electricity was not the
subject of larceny at common law 6 merely express general opinion.7  While
electricity is regarded by scientists as incorporeal and merely a form of energy, it
has been held to be personal property by courts dealing with situations uncon-
nected with larceny.8 Moreover, electricity is a valuable commodity, which is
bought and sold like other personal property. It can be measured, and severed
from a larger mass and distributed. As such it answers the tests laid down in the
gas meter cases " for property capable of larcenous caption and asportation. Rec-
ognizing this, the Philippine Supreme Court, in United States v. Carlos," held
electricity to be the subject of larceny. In arriving at this conclusion the court
said, "The true test of what is property the subject of larceny seems to be not
whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of
asportation by another"." While the court in the instant case was clearly in
sympathy with this view, it felt constrained by general opinion and more particu-
larly by one of its own dicta 32 to hold that at common law electricity was not the
subject of larceny.' As a result the court was forced to stretch the meaning of
"personal property" in the larceny statute in order to find that electricity was
included in its provisions. 14 In using this basis for its decision, however, the
i. ILL. R rv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 279.
2. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 380.
3. Ibid.
4. In holding that defendant was indictable for larceny despite the fact that his offense
also constituted a misdemeanor, the court followed general law. People v. Moulton, 116 Cal.
App. 552, 2 P. (2d) ioo9 (i93i); Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78 N. E. 6o7 (igo6);
People v. Malavassi, 248 App. Div. 784, 289 N. Y. Supp. 163 (2d Dep't, 1936).
5. E. g., ARiz. Rav. CoDE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4761; CAL.. PENAL CoDE (Deering,
1931) §499a; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) tit. 59, c. 325, §6150; DE. REv. CODE (935) c.
ISO, § 5226; GA. CODE (1933) § 26-3801; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 1431;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 18, § 3373; UTAH REv. STAT. (z933) tit. 103, c. 36,
§ IS; WASH. Rav. STAT. (Remington, 1932) tit. 14, c. 9, § 2657; W. VA. CODE ANN. (1937)
§ 5985; WIs. STAT. (0930) 3343.33 (2).
6. See instant case at 4o6; Moline Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Ill. 348, 357, 96 N. E.
1044, 1047 (I91).
7. Compare 36 C. J. 738 with i7 R. C. L. 34; see Notes L. R. A. 1918C, 58o, 582, (907)
6 A. & E. ANN. CAs. 739.
8. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936) (electricity property
within the meaning of U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3) ; Hill v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 22 Cal.
App. 788, 136 Pac. 492 (1913) ; Sixty-Seventh South Munn, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 1o6
N. J. L. 45, 147 Atl. 735 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; cf. Moline Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Ill. 348,
96 N. E. io44 (igii) (water power is an interest in real estate and not personal property).
9. See Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 298, 78 N. E. 6o7, 6o8 (I9O6) ; Commonwealth v.
Shaw, 86 Mass. 308, 309 (1862).
10. 21 Philippine Rep. 553. There was a statute involved in this case but it merely re-
stated the common law.
ii. Id. at 56o.
12. See Moline Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 III. 348, 357, 96 N. E. io44, io47 (i911).
13. See instant case at 406.
14. The court concluded that the Illinois larceny statute, supra note 2, providing that
"Larceny shall embrace every theft which deprives another of his money or other personal
property, or those means or muniments by which the right and title to property, real or per-
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court seems to have overlooked the established rule that criminal statutes are to
be construed in the manner most favorable to the defendant.,5
Labor Law-Constitutionality of Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act-
Plaintiff storeowner alleged that although he had no dispute with his two em-
ployes, the defendant labor union was picketing his shop in a violent and dis-
orderly manner in order to force him to employ only union labor. Held, that a
preliminary injunction should be denied, since under the facts as alleged the court
is without authority to issue an injunction by the terms of the Labor Anti-
Injunction Act of 1937,1 which is not in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion. Lipoff v. United Food Workers Union, Phila. C. P. Ct. No. 6, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Feb. 10, 1938, p. I, col. 2.
In arriving at the instant decision the court concluded (i) that the dispute
alleged was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the act; 2 (2) that the act
precluded the issuance of an injunction because the plaintiff had failed to allege
that "the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property
are unable to furnish adequate protection";3 (3) that under the Constitution of
Pennsylvania the legislature may abolish or change the chancery powers conferred
on the courts of common pleas; (4) that the statute as applied does not violate
the federal Constitution. Only the last of these conclusions presented any real
difficulty to the instant court. Although the constitutionality of statutes forbid-
ding the injunction of peaceful picketing is now settled,5 the section of the Penn-
sylvania act here applicable limited the court's power to enjoin violent picketing
in labor disputes. The only decision of the United States Supreme Court on this
particular issue was in Truax v. Corrigan,6 where a similar state statute was held
to be in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The instant court refused to distinguish the Truax case but said it was no longer
binding, because "intervening dicta of the appellate courts or supervening circum-
stances indicate that those courts would not hold today as they did before."' At
first glance this might seem to be a radical departure from the rule of stare decisis;
for admitting that the Supreme Court may and sometimes does overrule itself," it
does not follow that a lower court may overrule an appellate court precedent,' or
sonal, may be ascertained", included electricity. It seems that the provisions of the statute
broadening the common-law concepts were meant only to extend to choses in action and writ-
ten evidences of property rights, neither of which were the subject of larceny at common
law. See WHARToN, CamiNAL LAW (1932) §§ 1113, 1114.
i5. United States v. Resnck, 299 U. S. 207 (1936) ; State v. Cooper, 221 Iowa 658, 265
N. W. 915 (1936); Birdsall v. Lewis, 246 App. Div. 132, 285 N. Y. Supp. 146 (3d Dep't,
1936) ; Commonwealth v. Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. 126 (1929).
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 2o6 et seq.
2. Id. at § 2o6c (a-c). For comprehensive list of cases interpreting similar statutes in
other jurisdictions, see instant case at p. 6, col. 2.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 2o6i (f).
4. Art. V, § 20. See Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pa., 318 Pa.
401, 412, 178 Atl. 291, 296 (i935).
5. Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468 (I937), 37 COL. L. REv. 1227.
6. 257 U. S. 312 (1921) ; Notes (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 252, 31 YALE L. J. 408.
7. Instant case at p. 6, cOl. 4.
8. Illustrations are cited in instant case at p. 6, col. 4. See dissenting opinion in Con-
necticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1938, 5 U. S. L. WFnX 6io, 612,
noted in this issue of the REvimw at 543.
9. State courts are absolutely bound by the United States Supreme Court's decisions on
federal questions. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U. S. 209, 221 (1935) ; Ed.
Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 5o6, 5Io, 26i N. W. 20, 22 (1935), cert. denied, mb norn.
Henry v. Wadhams Oil Co., 296 U. S. 625. But see GRAY, TEE NATupa AND SouRacEs OF
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rely on a wholly hypothetical modern appellate decision. But the instant court's
reasoning is not indefensible even in terms of orthodox theory. The decision of
the Truax case was based on the principle that it is unconstitutional discrimina-
tion to provide special rules to govern wrongs in labor disputes which are not
followed elsewhere.'0 If the Supreme Court has in subsequent decisions aban-
doned this principle, a lower court would have ample justification for following
the ratio decidendi of these later decisions, rather than the bare factual holding of
the former case."1 That the Supreme Court has reversed its attitude to this
extent, however, is at least questionable. 12 Therefore it is difficult to see why the
instant court relied on this line of reasoning in order to find it was not bound by a
case which seems plainly distinguishable. The Trutax case dealt with a statute
construed as denying absolutely the injunctive remedy for admittedly tortious
picketing in labor disputes.' 3 The Pennsylvania Act on the other hand, merely
requires it to be shown that the police are unable to furnish adequate protection
before an injunction can be issued. Since this may be a common law requirement
in any injunction proceedings for a continuing trespass, 4 the basis for the conten-
tion that the Pennsylvania statute denies equal protection, even under the strict
rule of the Truax case, becomes somewhat tenuous.
Labor Law-Legality of Picketing Against Non-Union Product at
Premises of Retailer-Labor union, after unsuccessfully attempting to
obtain a union agreement with a manufacturer, sought to exert pressure upon him
by picketing his product at the retail stores. Signs carried by the pickets informed
the public that the store was selling a non-union product and requested them not
to buy. No effort was made to induce the public to refrain from all dealings with
the retailer. Plaintiff, one of the retailers, sought to enjoin the union activities.
Held (one justice dissenting), that the injunction granted by the Appellate
Division should be modified to permit peaceful picketing. Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
ii N. E. (2d) 91o (N. Y. 1937).
THE LA W (2d ed. 1927) 217, where two English appellate court cases are mentioned which
were so clearly erroneous that the English lower courts have refused to follow them. The
instant case should be compared with Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55
P. (2d) 1083 (936), aff'd, 3o0 U. S. 379 (1937), where the state court refused to follow
the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923). The Supreme Court in
affirming the state court's decision overruled the Adkis case.
10. 257 U. S. 312, 331 et seq. (I92I).
ii. ". . . the only thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subse-
quent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. . . ." Osborne to Rowlett,
13 Ch. D. 774, 785 (1879). "The concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but
it is the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as regards the world at
large." SALMOND, JUSRISPRUDENCE (6th ed. 192o) 173. But cf. Oliphant, A Return to Stare
Decisis (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 71, 159.
12. The cases cited by the instant court, p. 6, col. 4-5, show that the Supreme Court is
becoming increasingly willing to recognize the validity of distinctive rules to govern labor
disputes, but the cases cited were concerned primarily with "due process" and the definition
of interstate commerce. That the Court has changed its attitude in regard to "equal protec-
tion" was not conclusively shown. Also it is significant that the Supreme Court was careful
to distinguish the Trtax case in the opinion of Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 3o U. S. 468, at
479 (937). That the Court will change its attitude in regard to equal protection is more
probable but a lower court could not properly rely on this contingency.
13. See 257 U. S. 312, 328, 347 (1921).
14. Mechanics' Foundry v. Ryall, 75 Cal. 6oi, 17 Pac. 703 (1888). Cf. Great Northern
Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 Fed. 414, 423 (D. N. D. 1923) ; Grace Co. v. Williams, 2o F. Supp. 263
(W. D. Mo. 1937). But see Green Island Ice Co. v. Norton, 42 Misc. 238, 241, 86 N. Y.
Supp. 613, 615 (Sup. Ct. 19o3). The law is not clear on this point, however, and the issue
is seldom discussed by the authorities.
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Labor's use of picketing as a weapon of industrial conflict has nowhere
received more favorable treatment than in the courts of New York.' Though
today generally recognized as a lawful means of coercing an employer to comply
with the demands of the union,2 if conducted peacefully 8 and in pursuance of a
lawful purpose,4 picketing activities are restricted by most courts to the premises
of the employer with whom the union is engaged in dispute. Attempts to utilize
such coercive methods against third persons, not parties to the conflict, for the
purpose of inducing them to cease dealing with the employer, fall within the
definition of "secondary boycotts",5 and therefore have been enjoined.6 In New
York, however, the traditional ban of the "secondary boycott" has carried little
weight, attention being given rather to the scope of the pickets' appeal to the
public. 7 Thus, where the pickets' banners make no mention of the retailer but
merely request prospective patrons not to buy the employer's product, the lower
courts have consistently protected labor." The worker, it is said, has the right to
advertise his cause; he is doing so at the place where the appeal is likely to be
most effective-the point of sale to the ultimate consumer; therefore, the fact that
incidently the retailer's business is adversely affected is no reason for holding this
method of securing public support unlawful. This conclusion is supported by the
i. See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJuNcTioN (193o) 44-46; Feinberg,
Analysis of the New York Law of Secondary Boycott (1936) 6 BRooKLYN L. REv. 209;
Notes (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 83, (934) 9 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 7.
2. Early decisions tended to hold all picketing illegal because necessarily intimidating.
Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (S. D. Iowa, 1905) ; Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union, i56 Cal. 70, io3 Pac. 324 (19o9). See also Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the
Courts (932) 1o N. C. L. RLv. 158, 172; Lencioni, Injunctions to Restrain Picketing (932)
66 U. S. L. REv. 310, 312.
3. United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia Motion Pictures Operators' Union, 50 F. (2d)
i89 (E. D. Pa. 193i); Exchange Bakery & Rest., Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, I57 N. E.
130 (1927) ; and see cases cited in WiTTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DIsPUTES (932) 35,
n. i; Hellerstein, supra note 2, at i73, n. 2. On the subject of peaceful coercion generally,
see Eskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in. Labor Disputes (I937) 85 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 456.
4. Picketing, though peaceful, if in pursuit of an unlawful purpose, will be enjoined.
Edelman, Edelman & Berrie, Inc. v. Retail Grocery and Dairy Clerks' Union, i19 Misc. 618,
198 N. Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Heitkemper v. Central Labor Council, 99 Ore. 1, 192
Pac. 765 (i92o) ; cf. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F. (2d) 510 (App.
D. C. 1937). Generally demands for higher wages, shorter hours, and better working condi-
tions are recognized as legitimate objects of industrial disputes. See Note (1920) 6 A. L. R.
909, 917. Today unionization of a plant is usually considered a lawful purpose, while some
states have upheld the validity of disputes to obtain a closed shop. See Hellerstein, Second-
ary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341, 343. For discussion of lawful-
ness of purpose in non-labor picketing see case note in this issue of the REvmIw at 556.
5. A "secondary boycott" has been defined as "a combination to influence A by exerting
some sort of economic or social pressure against persons who deal with A." FRANKFURTER
AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note i, at 43. See also the definition laid down by Mr. Justice
Pitney in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 466 (i92o).
6. Fink & Son v. Butchers' Union, 84 N. J. Eq. 638, 95 Atl. 182 (1915) ; Evening Times
Printing & Pub. Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, i95 Atl. 378 (N. J. Ch. 1937) ; Meyer
Packing Co. v. Butchers' Union, 18 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 457 (1917) ; Parker Paint & Wall
Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 Wr. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911 (I92I).
7. New York, while ostensibly clinging to the dogma that secondary boycotts are illegal,
circumvents the rule in certain instances by refusing to designate the union activity involved
as a secondary boycott. See the concurring opinion of Judge Lehman, instant case at 914,
and compare with the dissent of Judge Hubbs, instant case at 915.
8. Public Baking Co. v. Stem, 127 Misc. 229, 215 N. Y. Supp. 537 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 216 App. Div. 831, 215 N. Y. Supp. 9o8 (ist Dep't, 1926) ; Engelmeyer v. Simon, 148
Misc. 621, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Tri-boro Window Cleaning Co. v. Krat,
241 App. Div. 799, 270 N. Y. Supp. 921 (ist Dep't, 1934). The picketing must, of course,
be peaceful. Stuhmer & Co. v. Korman, 241 App. Div. 702, 269 N. Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dep't,
1934), aff'd, 265 N. Y. 481, 193 N. E. 281 (1934).
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recent anti-injunction statute 9 enacted in New York, prohibiting the enjoining
of peaceful picketing in any labor dispute.10 The express inclusion, in the defi-
nition of "labor dispute", of controversies between disputants who are not
employer and employee 1" would seem to indicate an intention on the part of the
legislature to validate the type of activity involved in the instant case despite the
tenacity of the dogma that "secondary boycotts" are per se unlawful.:2 More-
over, in permitting mention to be made of the retailer's store, the court removed
a tenuous distinction heretofore articulate in the lower court decisions, to the
effect that any direct or indirect reference to the employer's customer was suffi-
cient ground for the issuance of an injunction.' 3 Inasmuch as such picketing is
impossible without at least an inferential reference to the customer, its legality
should be made to depend, not upon the nature of the pickets' signs, but rather
upon the determination of the more fundamental question: At whom is the boy-
cott primarily aimed? ' 4
Negligence-Forseeability as the Test for Determining Whether an
Intervening Cause Is Superseding-The car of plaintiff's intestate, being
transported by defendant's ferry, was first in line on shipboard. X's trailer-truck,
equipped with defective brakes, was third. Defendant, although it had blocked
the decedent's car, had both failed to block the car behind and negligently fas-
tened its front gate. X, in violation of a federal statute, started his engine before
the boat reached shore, and the truck, negligently left in gear, lurched forward
with such force that the decedent's machine was pushed over its block, through
the gate and into the river, causing the decedent to drown. Held, there was no
liability, since X's negligence was so extraordinary as to be unforseeable, and
therefore constituted a superseding cause of the accident. Hendricks v. Pyramid
Motor Freight Corp., 195 At. 9o7 (Pa. 1937).
As has been described in a previous issue of the Rxvmw,1 the Pennsylvania
courts have been in a state of confusion during the past decade on the question of
intervening human negligence as superseding cause. In view of this confusion,
the instant decision is important in that it has unequivocally adopted the prevail-
ing modem rule of "forseeability" 2 as embodied in the Restatement of Torts.
8 It
9. N. Y. Laws '935, c. 477, § 876-a. A discussion of the New York statute can be found
in Feinberg, spra note I, at 217.
io. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, § 876-a, i (f) (5).
ii. Id. § 876-a, o (c).
12. Similar statutes have been enacted in fourteen other jurisdictions. E. g., see Nonus-
LAGUMWIA AcT, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1937) ; MINN.
STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) c. 23, §§ 426o-67; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43,
§ 2o6a et seq.; Wash. Laws Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 7, § 4. Compare the Wisconsin statute, which
expressly provides that "nothing herein shall be construed to legalize a secondary boycott".
WIS. STAT. 1931, 268.20 (i) (f). For a discussion of the effect of anti-injunction legislation
on the established law, see Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 359.
13. Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 228 App. Div. 617, 232 N. Y. Supp. 886
(1st Dep't, 1928) ; National House Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Bobaluc, 243 App. Div. 699,
277 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1st Dep't, 1935).
14. See instant case at 912.
i. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv.
121, 126. The Court referred to this article in its opinion. See also Note (1928) 76 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 72o, and cases listed in RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (938) §§ 442 and 447.
2. Herman v. Markham Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (E. D. Mich. i918); Lake Erie & W.
Ry. v. McConkey, 62 Ind. App. 447, 113 N. E. 24 (I916) ; Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v.
Schnitzler, 2o8 Ky. 507, 271 S. W. 570 (1925) ; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Getty, 96 Md. 683,
54 At. 66o (903) ; Gordon v. Bedard, 265 Mass. 408, 164 N. E. 374 (x929) ; Englehart v.
Farrant, [1897] I Q. B. 24o. But see Illinois Central R. R. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 273, 170
N. E. 247, 249 (1930). See HARPER, TORTS (933) § 123; Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts
(I937) 5o HAnv. L. REv. 1225, 1229.
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 447.
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is hoped that this decision has placed Pennsylvania in permanent accord with the
majority of jurisdictions on this point.
Negligence-Unintentional Misrepresentation in Gratuitously Supplied
Information-Complaint alleged that plaintiff, second mortgagee of X,
telephoned defendant, first mortgagee, to inquire as to the interest X had in an
estate of which defendant was trustee. Both mortgages were in default to the
knowledge of both parties. Defendant agreed to supply plaintiff with a copy of
the will creating the estate under which X claimed. Defendant, without using
due care, sent a certified copy of the will of a different person having the same
name which plaintiff relied upon to his detriment. Held, plaintiff has not stated
a cause of action since not having alleged that it was part of defendant's business
to furnish the information, no duty to use reasonable care can arise.1 Renn v.
Provident Trust Co., 196 Atl. 8 (Pa. 1938).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently allowed recovery in a suit based
on a negligent misrepresentation. 2 But the instant case involves problems which
were not presented to the superior court: the information was gratuitous; the
defendant was not in the business of supplying such information; and the harm
suffered was financial rather than physical. The gratuitous nature of the infor-
mation would not seem to be controlling for the action sounds in tort and not in
contract. However, the gratuitous nature of an act is often regarded as material
in other fields of tort law. For example, there is no duty to use reasonable care
to discover defects in a chattel which is gratuitously supplied; and it might be
argued that the duty should not be greater in supplying information.3 But if the
supplying of information is looked upon as the rendering of a service, then the
principle of tort law that a person who gratuitously assumes to render a service
obligates himself to proceed with due care would seem to apply.4  As to the
defendant's not being in the business of supplying information, previous Pennsyl-
vania cases I as well as the Restatement of Torts 1 make this distinction and state
that where defendant is so engaged he owes a duty to use due care. The Restate-
ment refused to express an opinion as to the liability of a person who is not in the
business, treating it with a caveat.7 But the court in the instant case indicated
that the fact that the defendant was not in the business of supplying information
was the factor that barred recovery.' Perhaps this distinction is simply a "rule
of thumb" to get to the more basic requirement that the informant must under-
stand that the information will be relied upon." The final distinction is in relation
to the harm suffered being financial rather than physical. This distinction would
seem to be due to the socially and historically preeminent position given to bodily
i. The court also said that plaintiff had not alleged that defendant knew the object of
the request for the copy. It seems rather clear that if defendant knew plaintiff had a second
mortgage in default and was inquiring for a copy of a will which defendant said created an
interest for plaintiff's mortgagor, defendant must have known why plaintiff wanted the will.
2. Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191 Atl. 384 (1937), 86 U.
OF PA. L. Rav. 107.
3. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARv.
L. REv. 732, 741.
4. HARPER, LAw OF TORTS (1933) § 8. "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to
act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if
he acts at all." Cardozo, J., in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 239, 135 N. E. 275, 276
(1922).
5. M'Caraher v. Commonwealth, 5 W. & S. 21 (Pa. 1842) ; Houseman v. Girard Mutual
B. & L. Ass'n, 81 Pa. 256 (1876).
6. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1936) § 628.
7. Id., first caveat.
8. Instant case at 10.
9. That the court had this in mind is evidenced by their use of the reasoning that defend-
ant did not know why plaintiff wanted the information. See supra note i.
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security in tort law, rather than to any logical difference.10 Manifest from the
confusion in the field and the refusal of the Restatement to take a stand, the prin-
ciples which control recovery for a negligent misrepresentation are not dear.
However, it is significant that the Pennsylvania courts are handling the problem
in terms of negligence principles, rather than relying on the inapplicable rules of
common law deceit."
Public Officers-De Facto Status of Incumbent in Absence of De Jure
Office-Plaintiff sought compensation for professional services furnished
by him under a contract made with defendant city through its city manager and
commissioners. Subsequent to the contract, the statute creating these offices was
declared unconstitutional. Held, although no de jure offices ever existed, the
incumbents were de facto officers and bound the city to the contract. Michigan
City v. Brossman, ii N. E. (2d) 538 (Ind. App. 1937).
In the absence of any color of constitutional or legislative authority for an
office, it is uniformly held that a de facto incumbency cannot exist.1 And since
Norton v. Shelby County 2 the prevailing judicial formula has required a de facto
officer to occupy, at least, a de jure office.3 Because of its frequent conflict with
the public policy upon which the law of de facto officers is predicated, 4 the rigidity
of the rule has been modified in many states and denied recognition in others.
Thus, exceptions have been made (a) where the office has a potential existence
although lacking de jure character because of noncompliance with necessary
statutory provisions,5 (b) where the officer was elected or appointed before the
effective date of the enactment authorizing the office,6 (c) where more individuals
have been selected for office than there were offices of a particular denomination,'
(d) where another office of a de jure nature existed with powers similar to those
assumed,8 (e) where the incumbent has exercised the functions of an office sub-
sequent to its abolition, 9 and (f) where the existence of the office was predicated
upon an inapplicable statute."0  Most courts have denied de facto status where the
1o. See Bohlen, supra note 3, at 742.
ii. See (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 107.
I. Schulte v. Wilke, 167 Ala. 663, 52 So. 526 (igio) ; Herrington v. State, 103 Ga. 318,
29 S. E. 931 (i898); Metropolis v. Industrial Comm., 339 Ill. 141, 171 N. E. i67 (930);
Minnesota ex rel. Tamminen v. Eveleth, 189 Minn. 229, 249 N. W. 184 (933).
2. uS U. S. 425 (I886).
3. State v. Malcom, 39 Idaho 185, 226 Pac. io83 (1924); State ex tel. Abington v.
Reynolds, 280 Mo. 446, 218 S. W. 334 (i920) ; Hamrick v. Simpler, 127 Tex. 428, 95 S. W.
(2d) 357 (936). Contra: Wendt v. Berry, 154 Ky. 586, 157 S. W. 1115 (913); Lang v.
Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 9o (907), 6 MIcH. L. REv. 354 (9o8).
4. See infra note 15.
5. Buck v. Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, 42 Pac. 243 (1895) ; Clark v. Easton, 146 Mass. 43, 14
N. E. 795 (1888).
6. State ex tel Boclaneier v. Ely, 16 N. D. 569, 113 N. W. 711 (1907). Contra: State
v. Shuford, 128 N. C. 588, 38 S. E. 8o8 (1po). It has been held, also, that such incumbents
are de facto officers from the effective date of the statute. Yorty v. Paine, 62 Wis. 154, 22
N. W. 137 (1885).
7. Butler v. Phillips, 38 Colo. 378, 88 Pac. 480 (19o6); Walcott v. Wells, 21 Nev. 47,
24 Pac. 367 (89o).
8. Ex parte State ex rel. Att'y Gen., i42 Ala. 87, 38 So. 835 (igo5) ; Att'y Gen. ex rel.
Dingeman v. Lacy, i8o Mich. 329, 146 N. W. 871 (914) ; In re Woolcott, 163 Wis. 34,
157 N. W. 553 (I916).
9. Arnold v. Hilts, 61 Cold. 8, 155 Pac. 316 (igi6) ; cf. Keeling v. Pittsburg, V. & C.
Ry., 205 Pa. 31, 54 Atl. 485 (903). Contra: State ex iel. Abington v. Reynolds, 280 Mo.
446, 218 S. W. 334 (1920) ; Elyria v. Vandemark, ioo Ohio St. 365, 126 N. E. 314 (1919).
io. Lampasas v. Talcott, 94 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899).
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statute creating the office assumed was later declared void."1 However, as indi-
cated by the instant decision, there is respectable authority validating acts per-
formed before a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the enactment
and negativing, in general, the necessity of a de jure office where the incumbent
has acted under the cloak of legislative authority.12 Manifestly, it is unjust to
require the individual to determine, at his peril, the validity of the office which the
incumbent purports to fill. Furthermore, there is an apparent conflict between
the dogma of the Norton case and the accepted principle that the legality of a
municipal corporation, established under color of law, cannot be collaterally at-
tacked; 13 for since a city must act through its officers, the legality of its existence
may thus be impugned.' 4 In view of the policy protecting the interests of the
public and innocent third parties, from which the validity of the acts of de facto
officers has derived its chief support,'5 the holding of the instant court is com-
mendable in furthering a desirable trend in the law.
Taxation-Disallowance of Credit of British Income Tax Against Fed-
eral Income Tax-Taxpayer having received dividends from British cor-
porations from which the English standard tax had been deducted,' included
both the net amount received and the amount of the tax deducted in gross
income and then credited as provided in § 131 2 a portion of the English tax against
his federal income tax. Held, no credit is permissable since the corporation and
not the shareholder pays the English tax. Biddle v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.,
58 Sup. Ct. 379 (938).
The avowed purpose 4 of § 131, in providing 5 that a citizen of the United
States shall be entitled to a credit under proper limitations for income taxes paid
ii. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (1886) ; King Lumber Co. v. Crow, 155 Ala.
304, 46 So. 646 (19o8) ; People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 333, 24 Pac. 603 (I89o) ; State v. Malcom,
39 Idaho 185, 226 Pac. lO83 (1924) ; Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Ry. & Light
Co., 145 La. 3o8, 82 So. 280 (1919) ; Hamrick v. Simpler, 127 Tex. 428, 95 S. W. (2d) 357
(1936) ; Field, Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute (1926) I IND. L. J. 1, 5. For a severe
criticism of the majority rule on a related point, see Crocker, The Tort Liability of Public
Officers Who Act Under Unconstitutional Statutes (1929) 2 So. CALIF. L. REv. 236, 242-245.
12. Wendt v. Berry, 154 Ky. 586, 157 S. W. 1115 (1913) ; State v. Pooler, 105 Me. 224,
74 AtI. ig (19o9), 8 MicH. L. REV. 229 (191o); Burt v. Winona & St. P. R. R., 31 Minn.
472, 18 N. W. 285 (1884) ; Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N. J. L. 455, 68 Atl. 9o (1907), 6 MicH. L.
REV. 354 (i9o8) ; see Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. 436, 438 (1867).
13. See I DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. Igii) § 66 and cases cited therein.
14. This evident inconsistency was noted by Gummere, C. J., in Lang v. Bayonne, 74
N. 3. L. 455, 462, 68 Atl. 9o, 93 (907).
15. State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 467 (1871) ; State v. Pooler, 1O5 Me. 224, 229, 74 Atl.
119, 121 (igo9) ; Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465, 468 (1876).
I. One of the dividends was a gross dividend paid "less tax", INCOME TAX ACT, 1918,
8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 40, General Rule 2o. The others were net dividends certified "free of tax".
There seems to be no practical difference. Biddle v. Commissioner, 86 F. (2d) 718, 720
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
2. 45 STAT. 829 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 131 (1935). Under the 1928 Act the taxpayer
could also deduct from gross income the amount of the foreign tax not allowable as a credit.
Since the 1932 Act the taxpayer has been precluded from claiming a deduction for that por-
tion of the tax not allowable as a credit. 47 STAT. 179 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 23 (c), 2
(935).
3. Helvering v. Elkins was united in the appeal.
4. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. I (1932) ; Hubbard v. United States, 17
F. Supp. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 666 (1937) ; 3 PAUL AND MERTENS, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION (934) § 31.01.
5. ". . . the tax imposed by this title shall be credited with: . . . the amount of
any income . . . taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign coun-
try. ... ." 45 STAT. 829 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 131 (a) (I) (935).
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to a foreign country, has been to prevent double taxation. Thus it is necessary
to determine whether the British corporation 6 or the shareholder paid the tax
deducted from the dividends within the meaning of the Revenue Act. The
English tax system is based on the theory that all income shall be taxed at the
source.7 There is only one standard tax on income earned by a corporation.
The corporation pays this tax directly and the shareholder by deduction,8 but
it is only paid once. In England this system of deduction is considered as a pay-
ment by the recipient.9 While it is true that the corporation and not the share-
holder is directly liable for the payment of the tax,10 it is not necessary even in
this country for the taxpayer to make a direct payment in order to be considered
as having paid the tax." The recipient of income is required by English law to
submit to the deduction; ' 2 if he is not subject to tax he may claim a refund from
the Crown for the amount deducted; Is if he is subject to the surtax he must
include the amount of the tax deducted as income;'14 under certain circumstances
he may be liable to direct assessment on the dividend if the corporation has not
paid the tax; I and finally the House of Lords has held in Ashton Gas Co. v.
Attorney General'6 that where a company is limited by its charter to the pay-
ment of dividends not to exceed ten per cent, the amount of the appropriate tax
should be included in ascertaining the proper amount to be paid as a ten percent
dividend. While the Court conceded ' 7 that the factors regarding the refunds
and the surtax supported the English conception that the shareholder pays the
tax, it failed to discuss the other factors and concluded that the English standard
tax was similar in economic effect to our corporate income tax; that since the
shareholder in an American corporation is not allowed to credit the tax paid
by the corporation, the shareholder in the English corporation should not be
granted the privilege, or at least that Congress in using the word paid did not
intend to grant it to him. It is true that an Act of Congress has its own criteria
6. In Welsh v. St. Helens Petroleum Co., 78 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) a British
corporation subject to United States income tax on the profits from oil wells in California
was allowed to deduct from its federal tax the English tax paid on these profits even though
it could recoup the English tax from the shareholders. The Treasury had held prior to this
decision that the shareholder and not the corporation was entitled to the credit or deduction.
IV-x Cum. BuLL. I98 (1924); V-i Cum. BuLL. 89 (1925).
7. INc mE TAX Acr, i918, 8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 4o. The English Act defines a corporation
as "a body of persons", considering each shareholder as something like a partner from whom
the corporation may get the tax paid. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. White, 89 F. (2d)
363, 366 (C. C. A. Ist, 1937).
8. INcomE TAx AcT, 1918, 8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 4o, General Rule 20.
9. Instant case at 381.
Io. See Neumann v. Commissioners of Inland Rev., [1934] A. C. 215, 235. This case is
distinguished on its peculiar facts in Commissioners of Inland Rev. v. Pearson, [1936] 2 K.
B. 533. The latter case approves the language of Ashton Gas Co. v. Attorney General,
[i9o6] A. C. io, cited infra note 16, that "The companies here, in paying income tax under
Sch. D out of their profits pound by pound, and subsequently declaring dividends . . . were
in effect deducting income tax . . . (and) relieving the shareholder from liability."
ii. The doctrine of constructive receipt was expressly recognized in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) (payment by an employer of the income taxes
assessable against the compensation of the employee constitutes additional taxable income to
the employee).
12. INcomE TAx Acr, I918, 8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 4o, General Rule 23.
13. Id. § 29. The language of this section is significant as indicating that the shareholder
pays the tax: "If it is proved . . . that any person . . . has paid any tax, by deduction
or otherwise . . ." (Ital. added).
14. Id. § 4.
x5. Id. §211.
16. [I906] A. C. io.
17. Instant case at 382.
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of the meaning of the words used in the Act irrespective of local law,'8 and that
the burden of economic double taxation is no greater on the shareholder in the
English corporation than in the American. But it is doubtful whether the Court
would have reached the same result if the dividend involved had been of the ten
percent limited preferred type involved in the Ashton case.' 9
Taxation-Invalidity of State Tax on Insurance Companies Measured
by Gross Premiums Including Those from Reinsurance Effected in An-
other State-A California tax on insurance companies was measured by
gross premiums on business done in California, less deductions for premiums
paid by way of reinsurance to other corporations licensed to do business in the
state.' California sought to include, in taxing the plaintiff, a Connecticut corpo-
ration authorized to do insurance business in California, reinsurance premiums
received by plaintiff from other foreign licensed corporations on policies on the
lives of California residents. These reinsurance contracts were entered into in
Connecticut, and the premiums and losses, if any, were payable there. Held
(Justice Black dissenting),2 that the tax infringes the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, U. S.
Sup. Ct., (1938) 5 U. S. L. WEEK 6Io.
It is generally accepted that in making contracts of reinsurance in State A
with insurers of lives or property in State B, a foreign insurance company is
not doing business in State B 4 so as to be subject to its reasonable regulations on
foreign corporations; and hence state B may not, without violating the due
process clause, tax those premiums. Any other rule with respect to taxes, would
usually result in double taxation on premiums from contracts insuring what is, in
effect, the same risk. The premiums of the original policy would be taxable to
the insurer, and the reinsurance premiums to the reinsurer. California, however,
has specifically provided against this double taxation." Further, while the rein-
surer does not become actually substituted for the insurer on the original policy,
the practical effect of the reinsurance is that the reinsurer receives the benefits and
bears the risks of the original policy. As a result of this decision, California will
undoubtedly not allow its deduction provision to remain and the original insurer
18. See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 294 (1917) ; Weiss v. Wiener,
279 U. S. 333, 337 (1929) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103, 11o (1932). But cf. United
Dyewood Corp. v. Bowers, 56 F. (2d) 6o3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Keene v. Commisioner, 15
B. T. A. 1243 (1929) (French income tax based on the arbitrary figure of seven times the
rental value of the taxpayer's residence held to be an income tax paid within the meaning
of § 131 although such a figure was not income under our Revenue Acts).
19. See supra note io and 16.
i. CAL. CoNsT. (1879) Art. XIII, § 14 (b).
2. For discussion of Justice Black's dissent, see case note in this issue of the REviEw
at 543.
3. The California Supreme Court twice upheld this tax on the plaintiff. In the first
suit, an appeal from its decision in 3 Cal. (2d) 83, 43 P. (2d) 278 (I935), was dismissed for
want of a properly presented federal question, 296 U. S. 535 (1935). The instant case is an
appeal from 8 Cal. (2d) 675, 67 P. (2d) 675 (937).
4. There is no transaction or privity between the reinsurer and those originally insured.
Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 408 (1929).
5. Indiana v. Continental Ins. Co. of N. Y., 67 Ind. App. 536, 116 N. E. 929 (1917);
lit re Continental Casualty Co., 189 Iowa 933, 179 N. W. 185 (1920) ; Sea Ins. Co. v. Graves,
274 N. Y. 312, 8 N. E. (2d) 872 (1937).
6. The company which insured the original risk in California is allowed to deduct any
reinsurance premiums paid to one doing business in California. The reinsurer would, in
effect, pay the tax on the original premiums when he returned the tax on the reinsurance
premiums. CAL. CONsT. (1879) Art. XIII, § 14 (b).
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will be forced to pay a tax on premiums the benefits from which he does not
actually receive. However, a contrary decision in this case, while it might lead
to a more realistic and just result, would be difficult to support in terms of legal
theory since it would involve saying that whether or not a corporation affecting
reinsurance is doing business in a state depends on whether that state has a
statute which eliminates double taxation.7  In view of these legal difficulties
and the weight of authority, another decision could not well have been given.
Taxation-Validity of Income Tax on Proceeds of Discretionary Trust
Held and Managed Outside Taxing State-Petitioner, a resident of Vir-
ginia and the beneficiary under a discretionary trust, sought a refund of income
tax paid to Virginia on the income from the trust which was held and managed
in the state of New York. The trustees also paid an income tax to New York
on the proceeds of the corpus before turning them over to petitioner. Held, that
the tax was authorized by statute,' and that inasmuch as it was not levied on
property outside the jurisdiction of the taxing state, there was no denial of due
process. Ryan v. Commonwealth, 193 S. E. 534 (Va. 1937).
Since the Supreme Court in a series of decisions culminating in the Cohn
case,2 noted in a previous issue of the REVIEW,3 has upheld the right of a domicil-
Jary state to tax the income of its residents derived from sources outside the
state,4 the instant case seems to be correct in result. However, it fulfills the
predictions made after the Cohn case that double taxation would result from that
decision,5 and likewise shows clearly that relief from such taxation will have to
come from the legislatures through the medium of reciprocal tax provisions.6
7. "It follows that such a tax, otherwise unconstitutional, is not converted into a valid
exaction merely because the corporation enjoys outside the state economic benefits from
transactions within it, which the state might but does not tax. . . ." Instant case at 6I.
I. Although the provisions of the Virginia tax code relating to discretionary trusts [VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) app. § 5o] provide for taxation of only the trustee, it was held
that this applied only to domestic trusts and that income from foreign trusts came under the
general definition of gross income. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) § 24: "The term 'gross
income . . . includes gains . . . derived from any source whatever, including
income derived through estates or trusts by the beneficiaries thereof. . . ." But see VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §40 providing for reciprocal credits in the case of taxes paid
other states by non-residents subject to a Virginia tax, which seems to indicate a general
legislative intent to avoid double taxation.
2. People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937), 37 COL. L. REV. 66I, 21 MmiN.
L. REv. 759.
3. (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 645.
4. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (192o) ; Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U. S.
276 (1932). See Rottschaefer, State ATrisdiction to Tax Income (1937) 22 IowA L. REv.
292.
5. "Because jurisdiction of one state to tax income on the basis of localization within it
of the source of the income is apt to co-exist with the jurisdiction of a second state to tax
the same income on the basis of domicile, it would seem that the instant case [Cohn case]
opens wide the door to multi-state income taxation." (937) 21 MIN. L. REV. 759, 761.
Double taxation has been declared unconstitutional in the case of tangible personalty,
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, i99 U. S. 194 (1905), and inheritance taxation,
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312
(1932). The question of double taxation of intangible personalty appears to be unsettled.
Compare Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325 (1920) with Safe Dep. Trust
Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929). See also Commonwealth v. Madden's
Ex'r, 265 Ky. 684, 97 S. W. (2d) 561 (1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 427 (1937) with which
compare Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 193 Atl. 912 (N. J. 1937), 86
U. OF PA. L. REV. 1O7. See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of Itf
(1935) 48 HARv. L. REV. 407.
6. See reciprocal tax provisions of Virginia code, supra note i.
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Taxation-Validity of Pennsylvania Share Tax as Now Construed-
By an Act of 1907,' a tax was imposed on shares of trust companies the valuation
of which was determined by dividing the sum of the value of paid in capital stock,
surplus, and undivided profits by the number of outstanding shares. A 1929
amendment 2 provided for a deduction from the tax base of such amount as repre-
sented shares in corporations liable to pay the state capital stock tax, or exempted
therefrom. Though the amendment did not expressly so provide, the state court 3
sustained deductions for federal securities by finding a "legislative intent to
exclude" 4 them. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
that the state court is not precluded from construing the statute so as to avoid
constitutional objections, 5 and that the statute, as now construed, involves no
unconstitutional discrimination. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 58 Sup.
Ct. 295 (1938).
The interesting problems at issue in the instant case have been fully discussed
in a previous issue of the REVIEW.' The Pennsylvania court, in an earlier opinion
involving the same case,7 had refused exemption for federal securities. The
Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal, reversed the judgment and
remanded the cause 8 on the grounds that the tax represented an unconstitutional
discrimination, whereupon the revised construction involved in the present deci-
sion was adopted by the Pennsylvania court.9
Torts-Right -of Neighborhood Storeowners to Picket Competitors to
Force Them to Close on Specified Days-Defendant, an association of
neighborhood food storeowners, having adopted the policy of closing their stores
on Wednesday afternoons and Saturday evenings, picketed several competing
stores which continued to do business at these specified times. The dissenting
storeowners organized the plaintiff association which now seeks to enjoin the
defendant from picketing its members. Held, that an injunction against peaceful
picketing is denied 1 because defendant has justified its conduct as a means of
attaining a "maximum work-week", a reasonably desirable social objective.
Individual Retail Store Owners Ass'n v. Penn Treaty Food Stores Ass'n, Phila.
C. P. Ct. No. 6, Jan. 20, 1938.
Although the instant case is the first in which a Pennsylvania court has been
called upon to determine the legality of picketing in a non-labor controversy,2 the
i. PA. STAT. ANx. (Purdon, i931) tit. 72, § 199i.
2. Id. at § 2oo.
3. 327 Pa. 127, 193 Atl. 638 (1937).
4. Id. at 133, 193 At. at 64o. As to the implication of a legislative intent not to violate
the Constitution, see Estate of Johnson, i39 Cal. 532, 73 Pac. 424 (1903) ; Woolf v. Fuller,
87 N. H. 64, 174 Atl. 193 (1934).
5. Instant case at 298.
6. Note (1936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 758.
7. Commonwealth v. Schuylkill Trust Co., 315 Pa. 429, 173 Atl. 3o9 (i934).
8. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113 (935), 34 MICH. L. REv. 896
(1936).
9. Commonwealth v. Schuylkill Trust Co., 327 Pa. 127, 193 Atl. 638 (937).
i. The instant court had no trouble in deciding that the present situation did not involve
a "labor dispute" within the provisions of the recent Pennsylvania Anti-Injunction Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 2o6c, and therefore it could not be invoked.
Although an injunction was issued, it was merely intended to set the bounds of peaceful
picketing. The number of pickets before each store was restricted to two. Their placards
were enjoined from giving any connotation of a labor controversy. No violence, trespass, or
active intimidation was permitted.
2. It seems clear that Pennsylvania now follows the majority view recognizing the legal-
ity of peaceful picketing in labor controversies. Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 At. 566
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problem has arisen several times in the past few years in other jurisdictions.3
Because of the conflicting social policies involved, the decisions in these cases have
not been uniform. 4 But only one case has been found in which any court has
indicated that the privilege of picketing must be reserved solely for labor dis-
putes.5 There would seem to be little basis for such a discrimination, for peaceful
picketing is no more dangerous than combinations in general, boycotts, and the
circulation of propaganda by members of a trade. All of these have often been
permitted by the courts when their aim has been the elevation of business dealings
to a higher plane, socially or economically. 6 But since damage is intentionally
caused to the business interest of the person picketed, the pickets must legally
justify their conduct in order to escape liability for what is prima facie a tort.7
However, as the instant court points out, it is beyond the scope of the judicial
process to balance the social desirability of the ends sought by the pickets against
the inevitable damage caused to the person picketed and to the public. It should
be sufficient that the motive of the picketing in a given case is a reasonably justi-
fiable cause, under the circumstances, in order to privilege the intentional invasion
of the business interest of the other person, with due consideration given to the
necessity of picketing to secure the ends in view. It would seem that the instant
case represents a sound application of these principles and clearly recognizes the
utility of picketing as a publicity mechanism in an honest effort to dispose of an
existing economic dispute.'
(1933). See also for discussion of picketing in general, Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful
Picketing (1936) 35 Micir. L. Ray. 73; Eskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor
Disputes (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 456; Lencioni, Injunctions to Restrain Picketing (1932)
66 U. S. L. REv. 31o.
3. Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Ati. iO9 (1935) (picketing by negroes to force
merchants to employ their race enjoined) ; Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846,
274 N. Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934), 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 91 (picketing by customers to
protest extortionate prices allowed) ; Roseman v. United Strictly Kosher Butchers, 163 Misc.
331, 298 N. Y. Supp. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (butchers picketing butchers to disprove inference
that all meat sold was kosher allowed) ; Barnes-Arno Bldg. Corp. v. Hoffman, N. Y. L. J.,
Mar. 6, 1933, p. 1324 (picketing by tenants over rentals allowed) ; People v. Kopezak, 153
Misc. 187, 274 N. Y. Supp. 629 (N. Y. City Ct. 1934) (picketing by tenants over rentals
held to be breach of the peace) ; Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' & Dyers' Ass'n, 31 Ohio N.
P. (N. s.) 433 (1934) (picketing of competitors for reducing prices below those fixed by
N. I. L A. code allowed). See also Note (935) 99 A. L. R. 533; (1933) 33 CoL. L. REV.
1267.
4. See supra note 3.
5. See A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 369, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946, 953
(Sup. Ct 1934), 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 383 (1935), 48 HARv. L. REV. 691, 35 CoL. L. REV. 121.
See also Exchange Bakery & Rest., Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 264, 157 N. E. 130, 133
(1927). But cf. cases cited supra note 3.
6. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933) (not unreasonable re-
straint of trade under Sherman Anti-Trust Act) ; Booker & Kinnaird v. Louisville Bd. of
Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 224 S. W. 451 (192o) ; Wolfenstein v. Fashion Originators'
Guild, 244 App. Div. 656, 280 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Ist Dep't, 1935) ; see also Note (1934) 92
A. L. R. 185.
7. FRANxFuRTER AN) GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1929) 24 et seq.; HARPEI,
TORTS (1933) § 232 et seq.; Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (894) 8 HAuv. L. REv.
I, 3.8. "It [picketing] is a publicity mechanism designed to advise the public of the existence
of a present controversy between those picketing and the one picketed. . . . But if the ob-
jective is the honestly believed correct disposition of a real and existing economic dispute, it
is legal. Its purpose is to advise those who observe the information published and circulated
by the picketer that the controversy exists and its appeal is to those believing in the cause of
the picketer to aid as they lawfully may in the proper settlement of the contests." Bernstein
v. Cleaners' & Dyers' Ass'n, 31 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 433, 436 (1934).
